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Law Note
A PROPOSAL FOR PROSECUTORIAL
DISCOVERY DEPOSITIONS IN CALIFORNIA
INTRODUCTION
A criminal trial, like its civil counterpart, is a quest for truth. That
quest will more often be successful if both sides have an equal
opportunity to interview the persons who have the information
from which the truth may be determined. The current tendency
in the criminal law is in the direction of discovery of the facts
before trial and elimination of surprise at trial.'
Few people would question the soundness of this proposition. It
is surprising, therefore, to learn that the California criminal system
does not provide a pre-trial procedure for compelling a witness to
divulge information. Although a California court may ordinarily
not prevent a witness from being interviewed, 2 it may not order
the taking of depositions by the prosecution for discovery purposes.8
Often the oral testimony of a witness is the primary evidence of
a criminal act. To deny the prosecution access to such information
is to deny the judicial process its full potential for the ascertain-
ment of truth.
California is not unique in disallowing the use of prosecutorial
discovery depositions in criminal proceedings. Federal courts4 and
1. Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1966), aff'd on
remand, 410 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 865 (1969). See In
re Ferguson, 5 Cal. 3d 525, 531, 487 P.2d 1234, 1238, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594, 598
(1971).
2. See People v. Mersino, 237 Cal. App. 2d 265, 268-69, 46 Cal. Rptr. 821,
824 (1965); Walker v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 2d 134, 140, 317 P.2d
130, 134 (1957). An interview is an informal meeting between a party and
a witness. The party has no right to compel a witness to submit to an
interview; neither is the interview a court proceeding.
3. 4 J. DEMEO, CALIFORNIA DEPOSITbON AND DISCOVERY PRACTICE
16.03(9) (1971) [hereinafter cited as DEMEoJ; Shatz, California Criminal
Discovery: Eliminating Anachronistic Limitations Imposed on the Defend-
ant, 9 U.S.F. L. REV. 259, 263 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Shatz].
4. FED. R. CRIM. P. 15.
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a vast majority of states5 have similar rules. Historically, the early
common law forbade discovery, including depositions, by either
party in a criminal prosecution.6 It was thought that such cooper-
ation between the parties would destroy the adversarial nature of
the court proceeding.7 Later, a number of states enacted statutes
allowing conditional examinations, not for discovery," but for the
limited purpose of preserving the testimony of a witness expected
to be unavailable for trial.9
A recently emerging trend in criminal practice is the use of depo-
sitions as a discovery device for the defendant. 10 Although this
5. Vermont is the only state which permits prosecutorial discovery dep-
ositions. VT. R. CRIM. P. 15 (1974).
6. E.g., The King v. Holland, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248, 1248 (K.B. 1792). See
People v. Bowen, 22 Cal. App. 3d 267, 278, 99 Cal. Rptr. 498, 504 (1971);
Clark v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 2d 739, 741, 12 Cal. Rptr. 191, 193
(1961); State v. Goldberg, 261 N.C. 181, 191, 134 S.E.2d 334, 340 (1964); Jack-
man v. Court of Common Pleas, 6 Ohio App. 2d 182, 184, 217 N.E.2d 251,
253 (1966), rev'd on other grounds, State v. Court of Common Pleas, 9 Ohio
St. 2d 159, 224 N.E.2d 906 (1967).
7. Hewitt & Bell, Beyond Rule 16: The Inherent Power of the Federal
Court to Order Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 7 U.S.F.L. REV. 233,
233 (1973).
8. DEMEo, supra note 3, at 16.03 (9); Comment, Depositions as a Means
of Criminal Discovery, 7 U.S.F.L. REV. 245, 246 n.2 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Depositions].
9. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 15, § 297 (1958); Aaiz. REV. STAT. § 13-1881-85
(1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-2011.1 (Supp. 1975); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1335-
1345 (West 1970); COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 17; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 54-
86 (West Supp. 1976); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, § 414 (Smith-Hurd 1976);
Ky. R. Calm. P. 7.10 (Baldwin 1969); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 611 (Purdon
1964); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-46-1 (Supp. 1976).
The key provisions of the California Penal Code read:
§ 1335. [Cases in which conditional examination may be had]
When a defendant has been charged with a public offense triable
in any court, he in all cases, and the people in cases other than
those for which the punishment may be death, may, if the defend-
ant has been fully informed of his right to counsel as provided by
law, have witnesses examined conditionally in his or their behalf,
as prescribed in this chapter.
§ 1336. [Grounds for application]
When a material witness for the defendant, or for the people, is
about to leave the state, or is so sick or infirm as to afford reason-
able grounds for apprehension that he will be unable to attend the
trial, the defendant or the people may apply for an order that the
witness be examined conditionally.
CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1335 & 1336 (West 1970). "Unavailable as a witness" is
defined in CAL. EVID. CODE § 240 (West 1966).
10. See FLA. R. Calm. P. 3.220 (d) (West 1975). See also No. 147, § 1, 1961
system allows the criminal defendant to use the civil deposition pro-
cedures, the prosecutor may not use depositions for discovery. The
recent California court of appeal case, People v. Municipal Court
(Runyan)," approved this system for California. 1 2 Vermont, how-
ever, is the only state which clearly allows the use of discovery
depositions for both the prosecution and the defense.1 3
The purpose of this Note is to advocate the full use of dis-
covery depositions of non-party witnesses in California for the pros-
ecution. 14 By examining the reluctance of the California courts
to implement prosecutorial depositions, possible federal consti-
tutional barriers, and the policy arguments for and against such
criminal discovery procedures, this Note will demonstrate the
necessity for curative legislation.
REASONS FOR CALIFORNIA'S REFUSAL TO PERMIT
PROSECUTORIAL DEPOSITIONS
California's Penal Code sections 1335-1345 provide for conditional
examinations, but add the additional qualification that the state
may not conduct the examination if the defendant is charged with
a crime punishable by death.' 5 Because California's criminal dis-
covery procedures are largely a creation of the courts, not the legis-
lature,16 the limited statutory provisions for the use of depositions
in California are understandable. Under this judicial guidance
California has become a leader in criminal discovery1 7 and is among
Vt. Acts 314, which was repealed in 1973 and replaced by VT. R. CRIM. P.
15 (1974), which allows discovery depositions by both the prosecution and
the defense.
11. 63 Cal. App. 3d 815, 134 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1976), hearing granted, No.
77-9 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Jan. 13, 1977).
12. Id. at 824, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 111. The granting of the right to depose
a witness is in the trial judge's discretion as a matter of criminal discovery.
13. VT. R. Canv. P. 15 (1974).
14. California presently does not require the defendant to reveal the
names of witnesses he intends to call at trial. See Prudhomme v. Superior
Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 326, 466 P.2d 673, 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. 129, 133 (1970).
Therefore, the prosecutor in California would be allowed to depose only
those witnesses whose identity was learned through the prosecutor's own
investigations. This rule limits the usefulness of prosecutorial depositions.
California courts may, however, grant the prosecutor the right to discover
the names of intended defense witnesses. See note 38 infra. This Note
endorses such a procedure.
15. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1335 (West 1970).
16. B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRnVnNAL PROCEDURE § 271 (1963); DEMEO,
supra note 3, at f 16.03 (2); Kane, Criminal Discovery-The Circuitous Road
to a Two-Way Street, 7 U.S.F.L. REv. 203, 205 (1973).
17. Depositions, supra note 8, at 245-48.
[VOL. 14:936, 1977] Prosecutorial Discovery Depositions
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
the most liberal jurisdictions in its provisions for ensuring full dis-
covery for the defendant.' 8 In a state with such an active judiciary,
it is interesting that Penal Code sections 1335-1345, which were
passed in 1872 and act to deny discovery, have survived largely
without alteration. However, the courts have consistently con-
strued the statutes strictly and have stated that any change must
come from the legislature. 19 This judicial deference stems from two
sources: the California constitution and legislative rejection of lib-
eralizing amendments.
20
Prior to 1974, the California judiciary consistently held that the
state constitution restricted its ability to create criminal discovery
depositions. At that time article I, section 13 of the constitution
read in relevant part that
[t]he Legislature shall have power to provide for the taking, in
the presence of the party accused and his counsel, of depositions
of witnesses in criminal cases, other than cases of homicide when
there is reason to believe that the witness, from inability or other
cause, will not attend at the trial.21 '
The general conclusion was that this provision set the constitution-
ally permissible limits for criminal depositions. 22  Although that
conclusion is of questionable validity,23 it nevertheless was the basis
for denying the expanded use of depositions.
18. Yannacone v. Municipal Court, 222 Cal. App. 2d 72, 74, 34 Cal. Rptr.
838, 839 (1963); Depositions, supra note 8, at 245-48.
19. E.g., People v. Francis, 38 Cal. 183, 187 (1869) (decided under sections
562 and 563 of the Criminal Practice Act, predecessors to present California
Penal Code section 1335); Lee v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. App. 3d 851, 853,
130 Cal. Rptr. 532, 534 (1976); People v. Bowen, 22 Cal. App. 3d 267, 280,
99 Cal. Rptr. 498, 506 (1972); People v. Lindsay, 227 Cal. App. 2d 482, 510,
38 Cal. Rptr. 755, 773 (1964); Clark v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 2d
739, 743, 12 Cal. Rptr. 191, 193 (1961).
One commentator describes this judicial reluctance as the "peculiar self-
decreed impotency of the common law courts to order depositions." 5 J.
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1401 (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
20. See, e.g., Clark v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 2d 739, 741, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 191, 192 (1961).
21. CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 13 (1849, amended 1934, amended 1972, repealed
1974).
22. See, e.g., People v. Bowen, 22 Cal. App. 3d 267, 277-78, 99 Cal. Rptr.
498, 504 (1971); Clark v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 2d 739, 741, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 191, 192 (1961). The Code Commissioner's Notes to Penal Code sec-
tions 1335-1341 state that by the 1905 amendments "the provisions of the
statute respecting the conditional examination of witnesses have been ex-
tended so far as may be constitutionally done." CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1335-
45 (Code Comm'r Notes) (West 1970).
23. The courts or legislature could have found that article 1, section 13
In 1974, however, the legislature and the electorate replaced the
above-quoted portion of article I, section 13 by a provision of article
I, section 15 which states that "[t] he Legislature may provide for the
deposition of a witness in the presence of the defendant and the
defendant's counsel. ' 24 This provision contains no restrictive lan-
guage except for the requirement that the defendant and his
counsel may be present. After the enactment of the new provision
a court of appeal, in Lee v. Superior Court,25 faced the problem
of interpreting Penal Code sections 1335-1345. This court impliedly
recognized that the constitutional restraints embodied in article I,
section 13 no longer existed. However, the court did not interpret
the repeal as an affirmative signal to judicially create discovery
depositions. Rather, it continued the prior practice of strictly con-
struing the statutes and forbidding all depositions not specifically
authorized thereunder.26  The recent Runyan opinion, however,
breaks rank with that precedent. The Runyan court stated that:
It is not reasonable to conclude that legislative failure to amend
Penal Code sections 1335-1342 ... constitutes any showing of legis-
lative intent to limit depositions of witnesses in criminal cases. On
the contrary, we interpret the failure of legislative action as leaving
the development of general discovery guidelines, including deposi-
tions, to the judiciary.27
Although the 1974 constitutional amendments eliminate limi-
tations on discovery depositions, it is unclear whether Runyan is
correct in asserting that legislative inaction following the amend-
ment is equivalent to legislative approval of judicial action.28
was not a restriction on their power. The California constitution does not
grant power to the legislature; it merely restricts the otherwise unlimited
power of the legislature. Dean v. Kuchel, 37 Cal. 2d 97, 100, 230 P.2d 811,
813 (1951). The Supreme Court of Ohio addressed the issue of discovery
depositions when it stated:
Thus, when the General Assembly has [a general grant of power],
and Section 10, Article 1, says that depositions may be taken to
perpetuate testimony with the restriction that they may be used
at trial only if the accused is afforded the right of confrontation,
that does not mean that the General Assembly no longer has the
constitutional power to provide for some other kind of depositions.
State v. Court of Common Pleas, 9 Ohio St. 2d 159, 164, 224 N.E.2d 906,
910 (1967). The court explained that the maxim expressio unius est exclu-
sio alterius should rarely be applied. Id.
24. CAL. CoNST. art. 1, § 15.
25. 58 Cal. App. 3d 851, 130 Cal. Rptr. 532 (1976).
26. Id. at 852-53, 130 Cal Rptr. at 533.
27. 63 Cal. App. 3d at 823, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 110-11, hearing granted, No.
77-9 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Jan. 13, 1977).
28. The court in Lee v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. App. 3d 853, 130 Cal. Rptr.
532 (1976), attached no significance to the legislature's inaction. In fact,
bills had been introduced before the legislature to allow discovery deposi-
tions, but were not acted on. See note 35 infra. Runyan's conclusion, there-
fore, is conjectural.
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Runyan's interpretation may be vindicated in the future by the
California Supreme Court 29 or by legislative response to the opin-
ion.
To establish Runyan firmly as the law of California, one of three
events must occur. (1) The California Supreme Court must agree
with Runyan that Penal Code sections 1335-1345 do not delineate
the only circumstances under which a criminal deposition may be
taken, thus allowing common law development of discovery depo-
sitions. (2) The California Supreme Court must find that the limit
imposed by these sections is now constitutionally impermissible.
Or, (3) the legislature must codify the Runyan decision. The par-
ticular method by which defense depositions become available crit-
ically affects the future of prosecutorial discovery depositions in
California.
If the California Supreme Court affirms Runyan's interpretation,
Penal Code sections 1335-1345 will not present the sole means of
taking depositions. If this conclusion is true for the defendant, it
is probably also true for the prosecution. Because of the form in
which sections 1335-1345 are written, the court would be hard
pressed to find a legislative intent that the statutes are restrictive
toward one party and permissive toward the other.3 0 Affirmance
of Runyan would thus result in judicial discretion to grant prose-
cutorial discovery depositions.
A determination that discovery depositions are an element of due
process provides a second way to establish Runyan as California
law. The basis for such a decision is the criminal defendant's right
to a fair trial as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.31 Re-
cently, this fair trial guarantee has been expanded to include ade-
29. The California Supreme Court has agreed to hear Runyan on appeal.
No. 77-9 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Jan. 13, 1977).
30. In determining the legislative intent behind a statute, the statute
must be construed as a whole. 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 47.01 (4th ed. 1973). The legislature must have intended the
statute either as a grant of power to both the prosecution and defense to
conduct conditional examinations (not as a limit on other depositions) or
as a denial of power to both the prosecutor and defendant to conduct other
depositions. This situation should be distinguished from that in which a
court considers the constitutionality of a statute. For a discussion of the
effect of finding a portion of a statute unconstitutional, see note 33 infra.
31. See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 472 (1973).
quate pre-trial preparation and discovery.32 However, the present
construction of Penal Code sections 1335-1345 does not allow the
defendant to use depositions for discovery. It is possible to envision
circumstances in which a defendant cannot obtain adequate discov-
ery by means other than depositions. Thus, the denial of discov-
ery depositions denies some defendants their constitutionally guar-
anteed right to prepare their cases adequately.
If the court reaches the conclusion that Penal Code sections 1335-
1345 deny due process rights, it must declare those sections uncon-
stitutional. However, the court need void only the code's prohibi-
tion against defense discovery procedures.33 Because the state as
prosecutor does not enjoy a similar due process right, it will be lim-
ited to its present statutory right of deposing witnesses expected
to be unavailable at trial for the sole purpose of preserving their
testimony. The defendant will be allowed full use of depositions
for discovery purposes. There is reason to believe that the legis-
lature or courts would respond to such a one-sided situation by
granting increased discovery rights to the prosecution. 34
The third possible method for permitting discovery depositions in
California is by legislative enactment. In 1972, 1975, and 1976, at-
tempts to codify and expand criminal discovery procedures failed; 35
32. Evans v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 617, 625, 522 P.2d 681, 686, 114
Cal. Rptr. 121, 126 (1974). This concept is relatively new. For earlier cases
stating that pre-trial discovery is not required by due process, see Jones
v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 59, 372 P.2d 919, 921, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879,
880-81 (1962); Everett v. Gordon, 266 Cal. App. 2d 667, 674, 72 Cal. Rptr.
379, 383 (1968).
33. This statement is true because "[i]f a statute has two or more objects
and is valid as applied to one, but invalid as applied to another, the statute
may be upheld in its valid aspect, but will be condemned in so far as it
is invalid." 2 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 44.17 (4th
ed. 1973). The court will declare the entire statute void only if allowing
a portion of it to remain in effect destroys the overall legislative intent.
Franklin Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 63 Cal. 2d 222, 228, 404
P.2d 477, 482, 45 Cal. Rptr. 869, 874 (1965). This destruction occurs only
when the provisions are connected in subject matter, depend on each other,
and operate together for the same purpose. See 2 C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra, at § 44.04. Because Penal Code section
1335 is directed at two distinct parties, the prosecutor and the defendant, the
provisions are not so interdependent that they may not be severed.
34. See text accompanying notes 158-68 infra.
35. The 1972 legislation sought to codify the then existing defense rights
of discovery and require the defendant to give advance notice of his intent
to claim the affirmative defenses of alibi or incapacity. The bill was re-
ported from committee without further action. A.B. 2128, Cal. Leg., 1972
Reg. Sess. (March 15, 1972). Two bills were introduced in 1976, each seek-
ing to enact the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, which were drafted
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and
Prosecutorial Discovery Depositions
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however, since 1972 article I, section 13 has been repealed. Penal
Code sections 1335-1341 codified this constitutional provision. The
Code Commissioner's Notes concerning the 1905 amendment of
these sections states that "the provisions of the statute respecting
the conditional examination of witnesses have been extended so far
as may be constitutionally done."3 6 Thus, the legislature believed
in 1905, and may have continued to believe, that it lacked the power
to legislate in the criminal deposition area. Because article I,
section 13 has been repealed, the legislature is now free to expand
the use of depositions so long as other constitutional rights are re-
spected.31
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS
The constitutional rights of the accused are the primary barriers
to prosecutorial actions. In any proposal for prosecutorial depo-
sitions, two distinct constitutional issues arise: the right against
self-incrimination and the right of confrontation.
Right Against Self-Incrimination
The Constitution provides that "[n]o person . . . shall be com-
which provide discovery depositions for both parties. A.B. 4041, Cal. Leg.,
1975-1976 Reg. Sess.( March 18, 1976). This bill was set for interim study,
but no further action was taken. A.B. 585, Cal. Leg., 1975-1976 Reg. Sess.
(Jan. 27, 1975). This bill died in committee.
36. The significance of this Commissioner's Note (CAL. PENAL CODE §§
1335-45 (Code Comm'r Notes) (West 1970)) in relation to discovery deposi-
tions is tempered by three factors. First, the Commissioner's Note addresses
only conditional examinations; it does not address discovery depositions.
Second, the constitution, by specifically limiting when conditional examina-
tions may be used, had probably made other uses impermissible. Again,
however, it had not addressed discovery depositions. Third, the Commis-
sioner's Note is only the legislature's interpretation of a constitutional issue.
The court is the supreme authority in such matters. Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal.
3d 130, 141, 481 P.2d 242, 249, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 241 (1971); Bodinson Mfg.
Co. v. California Employment Comm'n, 17 Cal. 2d 321, 325-27, 109 P.2d 935,
939 (1941). Thus the legislature's analysis of the statutes is not binding.
37. The bills before the legislature in 1975 and 1976 called for a total
revision of California's criminal procedure. The legislature has not ad-
dressed the narrow question of prosecutorial depositions since the repeal
of article 1, section 13. See note 35 supra. Thus, the warning in Rodriguez
v. Superior Court, 9 Cal. App. 3d 493, 497, 88 Cal Rptr. 154, 156 (1970),
that the "doctrine of judicial abstention should persuade courts ... to for-
bear from adopting new and important procedural devices which the legis-
lature has considered and has rejected" is not applicable. Rodriguez ad-
dressed the issue of judicially creating a notice-of-alibi requirement.
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pelled. . . to be a witness against himself."' 3 Thus, serious consti-
tutional questions arise in granting the prosecutor the right to de-
38. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination is made applicable to the states as a part of the fourteenth
amendment's due process requirement by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3
(1964).
Previous decisions in California allowed the prosecution to compel pre-
trial disclosure from the defendant of certain evidence the defendant in-
tended to introduce at trial. E.g., Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56,
61, 372 P.2d 919, 922, 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 882 (1962) (granting the prosecutor
discovery of the names and addresses of witnesses an accused rapist in-
tended to call and x-rays he intended to introduce in support of his defense
of impotency). The theory of Jones is that such pre-trial disclosure does
not violate the defendant's right against self-incrimination because he is
merely required to accelerate the time of disclosure, not to disclose evidence
against his will. However, in California Jones has been largely limited to
its facts by Prudhomme v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 320, 466 P.2d 673, 85
Cal. Rptr. 129 (1970). Prudhomme held the self-incrimination privilege
"forbids compelled disclosures which could serve as a 'link in a chain' of
evidence tending to establish guilt of a criminal offense." Id. at 326, 466
P.2d at 677, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 133. California's rule appears much stricter
than is necessary under the federal Constitution. Many states have statutes
requiring the defendant to disclose names and addresses of witnesses he
intends to call at trial, reports of experts, and physical evidence he intends
to produce. E.g., FLA. R. CRm. P. 3.220(b) (West 1975) (making disclo-
sure contingent on a prior request for discovery by the defendant); OR. R.v.
STAT. § 135.835 (1975); VT. R. CRim. P. 16.1 (1974) (omitting physical
evidence). The federal procedure is similar but omits lists of witnesses.
FED. R. CRi. P. 16. The drafters of this rule relied upon Jones. FED. R.
Cmm. P. 16 (Advisory Comm. Note) (1975). The defendant may be re-
quired to disclose an intended alibi and the witnesses supporting that alibi.
See, e.g., FED. R. CRnvi. P. 12.1. The judge may deny the introduction into
evidence of undisclosed physical evidence, People v. Longaria, 333 Mich.
696, 697-98, 53 N.W.2d 685, 685-86 (1952), State v. McNamara, 543 P.2d 14,
16 (Or. App. 1975); FED. R. CRim. P. 12.1(d), or prevent undisclosed wit-
nesses from testifying, State v. Sharp, 202 Kan. 644, 649-50, 451 P.2d 137, 141
(1969); State v. Focht, 37 Ohio St. 2d 173, 174-75, 309 N.E.2d 922, 923 (1974);
State v. Wolfe, 273 Or. 518, 520-22, 542 P.2d 482, 483-84 (1975); FED. R. Cim.
P. 12.1 (d). See also Epstein, Advance Notice of AZibi, 55 J. Canvi. L.C. & P.C.
29, 35-36 (1964); Osburn, Pre-trial Disclosure Under the Oregon Crimi-
nal Procedure Code, 10 WiLLA .E E L.J. 145, 160-61 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as OsburnJ.
Pre-trial prosecutorial discovery in California may be permitted if the
concept of self-incrimination prevalent in other jurisdictions is adopted.
The court in Prudhomme, while denying prosecutorial discovery, stated it
"readily acknowledge[d] that pretrial disclosure would greatly facilitate the
administration of criminal justice by minimizing the element of surprise,
avoiding unnecessary delays and continuances, reducing inconvenience to
the court, counsel, jurors and witnesses, and permitting more effective pre-
trial preparation." 2 Cal. 3d at 323, 466 P.2d at 675, 85 Cal. Rptr. at 131.
The California Supreme Court recently admitted that the "federal high
court's decisions on questions of compelled disclosure to the prosecution
[are] not wholly consistent with our interpretation of the privilege against
self-incrimination." Allen v. Superior Court, 18 Cal. 3d 520, 524, 557 P.2d
65, 66, 134 Cal. Rptr. 774, 775 (1976) (4-3 decision). See also Reynolds v.
Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 943, 528 P.2d 45, 50, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437, 442
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pose the accused. 30 However, the rights of the accused are not vio-
lated by deposing a non-party witness because "[w]itnesses . . .
to a crime are the property of neither the prosecution nor the de-
fense. Both sides have an equal right, and should have an equal
opportunity to interview them. ' 40  The privilege against self-in-
crimination "is a personal privilege: it adheres basically to the
person, not to information which may incriminate him. . . . The
Constitution does not proscribe incriminating statements elicited
from another."
'4 1
A more difficult issue of self-incrimination arises if the defendant
conducts cross-examination at the non-party witness's deposition.
Although the state may not compel the defendant to conduct a
cross-examination, the testimony that the prosecution elicits on di-
rect examination may be so devastating that the defendant has no
real choice. This cross-examination could conceivably expose the
legal theories and factual bases of his defense.4 2 The situation is
(1974). The court may soon disapprove the Prudhomme doctrine. In Allen
the crucial fourth vote concurred on the facts, but desired the demise of
the doctrine. 18 Cal. 3d at 527, 557 P.2d at 68, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 777 (1976)
(Sullivan, J., concurring).
39. See 13A BENDER'S FORMS OF DISCOVERY § 8.15, at 8-345 (I. Hall ed.
1974). The United States Supreme Court in Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S.
605, 609-10 (1972), held that the defendant may not be forced to testify be-
fore the other defense witnesses have testified. The right against self-in-
crimination allows him to remain silent until he has heard both the prosecu-
tion's case-in-chief and his own witnesses. This holding logically precludes
the taking of a defendant's deposition.
40. Gregory v. United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1966), aff'd on
remand, 410 F.2d 1016 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 865 (1969). "Wit-
nesses are not parties, and should not be partisans. They do not belong to
either side of the controversy." State v. Papa, 32 R.I. 453, 459, 80 A. 12, 15
(1911). A witness may refuse to answer a question if it directly incrim-
inates him, but not if it incriminates another. 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2270
(McNaughton rev. 1961). The privilege may not be asserted by one indi-
vidual for another, nor may one individual complain that another's rights
have been violated. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 120 (2d ed. 1972).
41. Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 328 (1973). See also United
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233-34 (1976).
42. In California this material is not discoverable by the prosecutor.
The California Supreme Court has questioned the constitutionality of notice-
of-alibi statutes. Reynolds v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 842, 528 P.2d
45, 49, 117 Cal. Rptr. 437, 441 (1974). In fact, California so protects the
defendant's rights that the prosecution is denied discovery even during the
course of the trial "if the trial court determines [it] will conceivably
'lighten' the 'burden' which the prosecution bears in bringing about a con-
distinguishable from that presented by notice-of-alibi statutes re-
quiring the defendant to inform the state before trial of his intent
to claim an alibi as an affirmative defense. Here the defendant
initiates the disclosure and controls whether the affirmative defense
is introduced at trial. With prosecutorial depositions neither factor
is present. If the witness is unavailable at trial, the prosecution
would be permitted to admit the witness's essentially ex parte dep-
osition.43
Despite the initial impression that this situation is undesirable,
the courts and legislatures have indicated that such procedures are
not only constitutional, but also fair. The long standing approval
of depositions to preserve testimony evidences this attitude .44 Sev-
eral possible reasons exist for such acceptance. First, the cross-
examination is not a compelled personal disclosure. The defendant
may run a risk in not cross-examining, but he similarly accepts a
risk every time the fifth amendment self-incrimination privilege
is invoked before the trier of fact. Second, the defendant need
only cross-examine on those issues explored by the prosecution.
His only goal is to obtain rebuttal and impeachment evidence. He
need not expose his own theories or knowledge of special facts.
Third, the defendant need not obtain his discovery during the depo-
sition. He is free to conduct informal investigatory interviews with
the deponent. Thus, the defendant may develop evidence to rebut
the deposition without exposing his case to the prosecutor.
Right of Confrontation
The second constitutional argument is that depositions deny the
accused the right to confront his accuser. This sixth amendment
guarantee45 has three distinct components: the right of cross-exam-
ination, the right to have the witness under oath, and the right
to have the trier of fact observe the demeanor of the witness.4"
viction." People v. Bias, 31 Cal. App. 3d 663, 672, 107 Cal. Rptr. 519, 526(1973). But see note 38 supra. If the defendant had a right to avoid any
pre-trial disclosure, the hearings required under omnibus procedures would
be illegal. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 135.835 (1974).
43. Ex parte depositions are an evil which has long been forbidden by
the common law. See McCoRMICK, supra note 40, at § 244.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Singleton, 460 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973); People v. Feigelman, 65 Cal. App. 319,
223 P. 579 (1924); FED. R. Cifim. P. 15.
45. The sixth amendment right of confrontation was held applicable to
the states in Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). California guarantees
the right of confrontation in CAL. CoNsT. art. 1, § 15 and CAL. PENAL CODE§ 686 (3) (West Supp. 1976).
46. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968).
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The first two components are met under deposition practice. The
difficulty arises with the demeanor requirement. Although deposi-
tions will be used primarily for the in-court impeachment of wit-
nesses, thereby substantially mooting the demeanor issue, depo-
sitions will sometimes be used as the testimony of an unavailable
witness.
Earlier, the United States Supreme Court had stated that the in-
court appearance of the witness was necessary.4 7 In recent years,
however, it has become obvious that this is an overstatement. Rule
15 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits the use of
conditional examinations taken by the prosecution when the depo-
nent is unavailable for trial.48 Such a procedure was used with
approval by the Second Circuit in United States v. Singleton.49 As
a California court of appeal noted in the 1968 case of People v. Ash-
ford:5"
The emphasis . .. on confrontation by the trier of fact must be
tempered by the knowledge that the State Constitution authorizes
the use of depositions in criminal actions . . . ; that depositions
are used every day to determine important factual questions in civil
disputes; and that, when the witness is dead or seriously injured
there can be no possibility of confrontation by the ultimate trier
of fact.51
Further support is found in the practice of admitting testimony from
prior examinations or trials on the same action.52 Thus, the defen-
47. Id.; Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 315 (1969) (making Barber
retroactive). But see Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 471-73 (1900),
which reviews pre-1900 cases allowing depositions into evidence when the
witness was absent. Barber is considered the apex of the United States
Supreme Court's interpretation of the demeanor requirement. 8 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 15.02 (3), at 15-26 (2d ed. 1975).
48. FED. R. CUIm. P. 15 (d). The prosecutor under this rule may not con-
ditionally examine defense witnesses.
49. 460 F.2d 1148 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973). The
actual statute used in Singleton was not Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
15 but rather a similar provision found in the Organized Crime Control
Act of 1970. 18 U.S.C. § 3503 (1970). Accord, United States v. King, 20
CRim. L. REP. (BNA) 2348 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 1976); United States v. Ricket-
son, 498 F.2d 367 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 965 (1974).
50. 265 CaL App. 2d 673, 71 Cal. Rptr. 619 (1968).
51. Id. at 684, 71 Cal. Rptr. at 627 (citations omitted). The court in Vir-
gin Islands v. Aquino, 378 F.2d 540, 548 (3rd Cir. 1967), stated it was a
"well settled" proposition that the trier of fact need not observe the witness.
52. See Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 216 (1972); People v. Lint, 182
Cal. App. 2d 402, 420, 6 Cal. Rptr. 95, 106 (1960); People v. Paysen, 123
dant's right of confrontation is not violated by permitting the prose-
cution to depose non-party witnesses.
POLICY ARGUMENTS AGAINST PROSECUTORIAL DISCOVERY DEPOSITIONS
If the trial court has the discretion 53 to grant prosecutorial dis-
covery depositions, a mere demonstration that such discovery is
constitutional may be insufficient. Similarly, the California legis-
lature will not statutorily create prosecutorial discovery depo-
sitions merely because such actions are within its power. A review
of California's judicial 54 and legislative5 5 history shows a general
acceptance of the present system. This acceptance is partially ex-
plained by the legislature's and judiciary's feeling of inability to
act in the face of constitutional restraints.50 Even though these re-
straints were recently removed by the repeal of article I, section
13 of the California constitution and by the United States Supreme
Court's interpretations of the fifth and sixth amendments, 7 with
Cal. App. 396, 398, 11 P.2d 431, 432 (1932) (allowing testimony of witness
given at preliminary hearing to be admitted substantively when witness un-
available for trial). But see Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968) (stat-
ing that a cross-examination at a preliminary hearing in certain circum-
stances may not meet the requirements of the confrontation clause); Pointer
v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965) (holding that the sixth amendment re-
quires "complete and adequate" cross-examination); People v. Gibbs, 255
Cal. App. 2d 739, 743-44, 63 Cal. Rptr. 471, 476 (1968) (holding that on the
particular facts of the case a transcript of the preliminary hearing could
not be admitted because of lack of confrontation).
The long standing admissability of prior testimony if the witness is un-
available is based on the prosecutor's "necessity" of introducing relevant
evidence. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 168 n.16 (1970). Under
California civil practice if the witness is available, a deposition may not be
used for purposes other than impeachment. See CAL. Crw. Paoc. CODE § 2016
(d) (West Supp. 1976). The defendant has a constitutional right to compel
attendance of witnesses. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 (1967). See
also Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 96 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). Thus,
the confrontation issue will arise only when the deponent is unavailable-
the exact circumstances under which prior testimony has long been ad-
mitted.
53. See, e.g., Pritchess v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 531, 538, 522 P.2d 305,
309, 113 Cal. Rptr. 897, 901-02 (1974); Hill v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d
812, 817, 518 P.2d 1353, 1356, 112 Cal. Rptr. 257, 260 (1974).
54. See, e.g., Lee v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. App. 3d 851, 852-53, 130 Cal.
Rptr. 532, 533 (1976); Everett v. Gordon, 266 Cal. App. 2d 667, 671, 72 Cal.
Rptr. 379, 381 (1968); People v. Lindsay, 227 Cal. App. 2d 482, 510, 38 Cal.
Rptr. 755, 773 (1964).
55. Courts have found highly significant the fact that when in 1957 the
legislature provided for depositions in civil cases it made no change in the
criminal practice. E.g., Clark v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 2d 739, 742,
12 Cal. Rptr. 191, 193 (1961). See also note 35 supra.
56. See text accompanying notes 19-28 supra.
57. See text accompanying notes 38-52 supra.
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the exception of Runyan,5s there has been no liberalizing movement
in this field. Policy considerations are probably responsible. Op-
ponents of prosecutorial discovery envision a multitude of abuses
flowing from reciprocal discovery depositions. Such abuses include
perjury and intimidation of witnesses,59 financial and adminis-
trative burdens for prosecutors and defendants, 60 an undesirable
balance in favor of the prosecution in access to evidence,"' and the
defendant's being forced to examine witnesses without adequate
preparation. 2  Such reasons, however, lack validity in light of
modern legal practices.
Perjury and Intimidation
One of the chief arguments against prosecutorial discovery depo-
sitions is that their use would increase the possibility of perjured
testimony.63 Opponents of liberalized discovery claim that a party
armed with advance knowledge of the adverse party's case can bribe
or intimidate witnesses into providing testimony precisely designed
to defeat the adversary's evidence and legal theories. In the 1953
New Jersey Supreme Court case of State v. Tune,0 4 Chief Justice
Vanderbilt's statement clarified this proposition.
Another result of full discovery would be that the criminal defen-
dant who is informed of the names of all of the State's witnesses
may take steps to bribe or frighten them into giving perjured testi-
mony or into absenting themselves so that they are unavailable to
testify ... The presence of perjury in criminal proceedings today
is extensive despite the efforts of the courts to eradicate it and con-
stitutes a very serious threat to the administration of criminal jus-
tice and thus to the welfare of the country as a whole .... To
permit unqualified disclosure . . . would defeat the very ends of
justice.0 5
58. People v. Municipal Court (Runyan), 63 Cal. App. 3d 815, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 103 (1976), hearing granted, No. 77-9 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Jan. 13, 1977).
59. See text accompanying notes 63-80 infra.
60. See text accompanying notes 81-90 infra.
61. See text accompanying notes 91-114 infra.
62. See text accompanying notes 115-19 infra.
63. State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210-11, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953); Langrock,
Vermont's Experiment in Criminal Discovery, 53 A.B.A.J. 732, 734 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Langrock]; Louisell, Criminal Discovery: Dilemma
Real or Apparent?, 49 CALIF. L. REV. 56, 57 (1961); Shatz, supra note 3, at
261.
64. 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).
65. Id. at 210-11, 98 A.2d at 884. Various forms of intimidation exist.
A similar argument made in opposition to prosecutorial use of
depositions is based on a questionable assumption, does not address
competing considerations, and ignores rebutting evidence.
The argument's basic assumption is that the prosecutor's oppor-
tunity to depose some witnesses increases his ability to shape the
testimony of other witnesses. An example will illustrate the con-
templated situation. The prosecutor seeks to convict the defendant
for assaulting the victim. He originally plans his case around the
testimony of A, a friendly witness, that the defendant attacked the
victim at 9:00 p.m. However, upon deposing hostile defense witness
B, he learns that B saw the victim at 10:00 p.m. and that the vic-
tim at that time did not bear signs of injury. An unscrupulous
prosecutor could attempt to induce witness A to testify he viewed
the assault at 11:00 p.m. Alternatively, he may induce witness B
to state he was mistaken in his deposition testimony and that he
actually saw the victim at 8:00 p.m.
Opponents of prosecutorial discovery assert that the described
misconduct could not occur in the absence of prosecutorial depo-
sitions. However, if the prosecutor has the resources to convince
hostile witness B he should change his testimony after it is recorded
in a deposition, the prosecutor can probably convince B to reveal
his testimony even without the deposition. In addition, if Califor-
nia adopts discovery depositions for the defendant and the defen-
dant chooses to depose the witness, the prosecutor will obtain the
requisite information by cross-examination. 0 In an unregulated sit-
uation the testimony of friendly witness A could be tailored to
meet any evidence discovered in B's deposition. However, the testi-
mony of the prosecution's witness is often fixed by his testimony
at a grand jury or preliminary hearing. Thus, the prosecutor's wit-
ness could not change the basic structure of his testimony without
being impeached by his prior testimony. 7 Making prosecutorial
Classic examples are threats of physical violence, United States v. Estep,
151 F. Supp. 668, 672-73 (N.D. Tex. 1957); People v. Chin Hane, 108 Cal.
597, 603, 41 P. 697, 699 (1895), or economic retaliation, Bergan Drug Co.
v. Parke, Davis & Co., 307 F.2d 725, 727 (3d Cir. 1962).
66. A deposition is by definition a two-party affair with the right to
cross-examine. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 2004 (West 1955).
67. CAL. EViD. CODE §§ 770, 780(h), & 1235 (West 1966). California allows
the use of a prior inconsistent statement for impeachment purposes or for
its probative value if the witness is present to explain or deny the state-
ment. People v. Strickland, 11 Cal. 3d 946, 953-54, 523 P.2d 672, 676, 114
Cal. Rptr. 632, 636 (1974). But see People v. Agee, 67 Cal. App. 3d 148, 155,
136 Cal. Rptr. 492, 495 (1977), which holds that unsworn prior inconsistent
statements of a witness are not admissible for the truth of the matter
asserted. Such pre-trial statements are valuable because the witnesses have
not yet rehearsed their testimony. Daniel, Criminal Discovery: A Matter
of Fundamental Fairness, 12 GA. ST. B.J. 134, 134 (1976).
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and defense depositions unavailable pending the conclusion of the
grand jury or preliminary hearing minimizes the possibility of pros-
ecutorial misconduct. Allowing the defendant to depose the prose-
cution's witnesses before granting prosecutorial depositions is an
additional safeguard to prevent the prosecutor from shaping his wit-
ness's testimony. Thus, by proper regulation of the procedure, the
defendant is protected from prosecutorial efforts to suborn perjury
or intimidate witnesses.
In contrast, the potential for abuse by the defendant is obvious
if California denies the prosecutor discovery depositions while
granting the defendant such depositions. The defendant may ini-
tially study the prosecution's evidence and legal theories when they
are presented at the grand jury or preliminary hearings.0 8 He may
then obtain further knowledge of the prosecutor's case through
either formal discovery6 9 or the "open file" policy of many prose-
cutor's offices.70 Equipped with this knowledge, he can conduct
a searching examination when deposing the prosecutor's witnesses.
After assembling this complete dossier on the prosecution's case,
he can analyze it in depth. Through careful planning and tailoring
of testimony, the defendant and his witnesses may create an almost
irrebuttable defense.7 1
The prosecutor is presently powerless to prevent such abuses by
the defendant. Although he may informally interview witnesses
with their consent, he has no reasonable means of compelling their
pre-trial cooperation. Thus the defendant can mold the testimony
of his witnesses up until the very moment of trial. By allowing
the prosecutor to take depositions, the dangers of this situation are
largely avoided. The prosecutor can "freeze" the testimony of de-
fense witnesses at an early date.72 Once this testimony is frozen,
the possibility of impeachment will deter the defendant from at-
tempting to change the testimony at trial.73
68. See text accompanying notes 109-13 infra.
69. See text accompanying notes 105-07 infra.
70. See text accompanying notes 101-04 infra.
71. This result also occurs when notice-of-alibi statutes are not in effect,
thus leaving the prosecutor unable to expose the fabrication. 6 J. WInmORE,
EvmENcE § 1855 (b) (Chadbourn rev. 1974).
72. ABA Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice-A Student Sympos-
ium-Louisiana and Criminal Discovery, 33 LA. L. REV. 596, 599 n.13 (1973).
73. See note 67 supra.
If a defense witness presents perjured testimony at trial, the un-
perjured deposition of an unavailable defense witness may contain
contradicting evidence. Because the deponent is unavailable, the
deposition may be used for its substantive value.7 4 Thus, in the
deposition the prosecution has a valuable weapon to ensure the
truthful testimony of both the deponent and the other defense
witnesses.
The long civil experience confirms that reciprocal rights to depo-
sitions discourages perjury rather than promotes it.7 Vermont,
which previously allowed only the defendant to take depositions
in criminal cases, amended its procedure in 1974 to allow the
prosecutor a similar right.76 Thus, experience shows that the inter-
ests of justice are best served by allowing both parties to depose
witnesses.
Some of the most respected authorities in the United States
have noted that deposition practice avoids perjury and promotes
discovery. The Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Cri-
minal Procedure 16 stated that the purpose of allowing prosecu-
torial depositions to preserve the testimony of witnesses whose lives
would be endangered by disclosure was "to make pretrial disclosure
possible and at the same time to minimize any inducement to use
improper means to force the witness either to not show up or to
change his testimony before a jury.' '77  Mr. Justice William J.
Brennan made the most powerful statement against the specter of
perjury.
I could not be persuaded . . . that the old hobgoblin perjury,
invariably raised with every suggested change in procedure to make
easier the discovery of truth, supports the case against criminal dis-
covery. I should think, rather, that its complete fallacy has been
starkly exposed through the extensive and analogous experience in
civil causes. 78
74. See CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 2016(d) (West Supp. 1976); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 1345 (West 1970).
75. Address by Associate Justice William J. Brennan, Symposium at the
Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, Wash. D.C. (May
9, 1963), printed in 33 F.R.D. 56, 62 (1964). See Speck, The Use of Discov-
ery in United States District Courts, 60 YALE L.J. 1132, 1154 (1951). This
article concerned a study of civil practice done by the Administrative Office
of the United States Courts. The author of the article concluded that most
attorneys reject the contention that discovery leads to perjury.
76. VT. R. Cnvr. P. 15 (1974).
77. FED. R. CEim. P. 16 (Advisory Comm. Note) (1975) (emphasis added).
78. Brennan, supra note 75. The American Bar Association has implic-
itly rejected the idea that discovery leads to perjury or the intimidation
of witnesses. Weininger, Criminal Discovery and Omnibus Procedure in a
Federal Court: A Defense View, 49 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 514, 517-18 (1976). An
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A last factor exposing the fallacy of the perjury argument is that
the state, as an authority figure with huge investigatory powers,
in most instances obtains sufficient evidence even in the absence
of depositions.O Thus, the use of depositions generally will not in-
crease the state's ability to tailor its testimony to counteract the
expected defense. Rather, the effect will be preserving testimony
while affording the prosecution a more economical means of
gathering evidence.80
Financial and Administrative Problems
A second argument against prosecutorial use of depositions is that
it imposes a financial and administrative burden on both the defen-
dant and the prosecutor. The civil experience demonstrates that
the deposition process can be expensive and time-consuming.,' The
use of depositions in criminal cases will be even more expensive
because the confrontation clauses of the United States and Califor-
nia Constitutions guarantee the defendant's right to be present at
the taking of the deposition. The exercise of this right necessarily
involves travel expenses either for the witness or for the parties.
If the defendant is in custody, provisions must be made to prevent
his escape. Special facilities must be provided for taking criminal
depositions.8 2 In addition, expensive legal counsel may be present.
All these factors substantiate claims that a deposition procedure
can be expensive.
The true issue, however, is which device will provide the least
expensive means of obtaining information concerning a case. If dis-
covery through depositions is unavailable, the prosecutor must de-
ABA advisory committee stated that "the answer to the alleged untrust-
worthiness of counsel is not the denial of procedures beneficial to the proc-
ess, but improvement in the standards for lawyers' conduct and more effi-
cient discipline." ABA ADVISORY COMM. ON PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS, STAND-
ARDS RELATING TO DISCOVERY AND PRocEDuRE BEFORE TRIAL (approved draft),
pt. 1, Standard 1.2, at 39 (Commentary) Oct. 1970. For a similar view, see
United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 320 (1973).
79. See note 92 infra.
80. See text accompanying notes 138-40 infra concerning the advantages
of preserving a witness's testimony. See text accompanying notes 81-87
infra concerning the economics of depositions.
81. Depositions, supra note 8, at 251; Speck, supra note 75, at 1138.
82. Clark v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 2d 739, 743, 12 Cal. Rptr. 191,
193 (1961).
velop his information through the investigatory arms of law en-
forcement agencies and his personal efforts.83
The inferiority of the investigatory process, both economically
and qualitatively, is evidenced by the frequent use of depositions
in civil practice. In civil litigation each party desires to minimize
its costs. Because attorney's fees (the major expense) are not
generally awarded the prevailing litigant,8 4 each party uses the
least expensive method for obtaining information. Depositions are
frequently used because a short deposition often produces more in-
formation than do several hours of investigation. 5 In addition, if
the deposition process is not used, each party must conduct its own
investigation. Thus, the cost of one deposition proceeding must be
compared with the cost of conducting two separate investigations.
Because the majority of cases in California state courts involve indi-
gent defendants, 6 the state must usually bear the costs of either
depositions or an investigation.8 7 It therefore appears that the sub-
stitution of depositions for investigations can effect substantial
savings for both the defense and prosecution.
The deposition process does impose extra administrative burdens
on the prosecutor and the defense counsel by requiring personal
attendance at the time the witness is deposed at hearings on possible
collateral issues concerning the depositions.88 However, because
83. The prosecutor in California has virtually no formal discovery de-
vices because of California's strict interpretation of the defendant's fifth
amendment self-incrimination privilege. See generally note 42 supra.
84. See LeFave v. Dimond, 46 Cal. 2d 868, 870, 299 P.2d 858, 859 (1956);
CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 1021 (West 1955).
85. Deposition, supra note 8, at 251.
86. One commentator estimated in 1965 that 60% of all felony defendants
and 25% to 50% of all misdemeanor defendants could not afford counsel.
An estimated 50% needed appointed counsel for appeals and other post-con-
viction matters. S. SILvERsTEIN, DEFNSE OF THE POOR 8-9(1965).
87. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.2 (West Supp. 1976) grants the court power
to award a "reasonable sum for compensation and for necessary expenses."
Such expenses may include costs of employing investigators and experts.
41 CAL. Op. ATT'Y GEN. 62-237 (1973). The Vermont and federal rules
permit the court to charge the government for the costs incurred by a
defendant in attending a prosecutorial deposition or by an indigent defend-
ant in attending a defense deposition. FED. R. Cnm. P. 15 (c); VT. R. CnIM.
P. 15(c) (1974).
88. For example, a prosecutor may seek to depose the spouse of the de-
fendant. The defendant may oppose the deposition on the grounds the in-
formation sought is protected by the marital communications privilege. A
pre-trial hearing must be held to determine whether the deposition may
be taken.
Depositions also work a burden on non-party witnesses. Courts are slow
in subjecting such involuntary participants to the court's compulsory proc-
cess. Traynor, Ground Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39 N.Y.U.
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depositions are more economical than investigations, the state could
merely shift its funding from the investigative agencies to the pro-
secutorial agencies. With this greater funding the prosecutor's of-
fice could expand its legal staff to compensate for the increased
workload.
A valuable by-product of shifting the investigative function to
the prosecutor's office is a reduction in the prosecutor's need to
rely on -the veracity and completeness of the investigative agency's
reports. In some instances this division in functions results in in-
justice to the defendant.8 9 By personally observing the deponent's
testimony during a deposition, the attorney avoids distortions which
are inevitable with secondary information such as reports and sum-
maries. In addition, he observes the demeanor of the witness. With
this firsthand information the prosecutor is better prepared to ex-
amine the witness at trial.
The possibility of abusing the deposition process and thereby
causing administrative or financial burdens does exist. An indigent
or extremely wealthy defendant could request such extensive dep-
ositions that the prosecutor would prefer accepting a plea of guilty
to a lesser offense or even foregoing the prosecution. Similarly,
the prosecutor, by conducting extensive depositions, could economi-
cally blackmail a non-indigent defendant into a guilty plea. Such
potential abuses, however, can be controlled by protective court
orders.90 With this protection depositions will prove to be an inex-
pensive, easily administered procedure.
L. REV. 228, 245 (1964). However, witnesses are subjected to such incon-
venience in civil suits in which the interests of the parties are generally
much less. Thus, this argument appears without foundation.
89. See Address by Dean A. Kenneth Pye, Symposium at the Judicial
Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, Wash., D.C. (May 9, 1963),
printed in Pye, The Defendant's Case for More Liberal Discovery, 33 F.R.D.
82, 88 (1964). One case of such an injustice occurred when a defendant
claimed another person with the same nickname as his had committed the
charged offense. The United States Attorney denied in court that such an
individual existed. Through an error in FBI procedures the defendant
gained access to normally closed FBI files. Those files showed that such
an individual did exist. The police officials had never informed the United
States Attorney of this fact. Id.
90. Protective orders for civil depositions may be issued for cause under
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 2019(b) (1) & (d) (West Supp. 1976). The court
may change the time or place of the deposition, limit the subject of inquiry,
deny the deposition, assess costs, or make any other order necessary to pro-
Balance of Discovery Powers
The use of depositions by the prosecution is also opposed on the
ground that the balance in access to information between the defen-
dant and the prosecutor will be upset. This balance refers to the
relative abilities of the opposing parties to secure the evidence neces-
sary to prove their positions. The defendant should not be at a
disadvantage vis A vis the prosecution in his ability to obtain this
evidence.01 Opponents of increased prosecutorial discovery believe
that the balance presently favors the prosecutor 92 and that he
should not be given any further advantages.
However, this argument is based on the proposition that the pros-
ecutor enjoys a superior position in access to the facts surrounding
a case. In light of recent advances in defense discovery, 93 it is ques-
tionable whether such a position exists. The Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 16(c) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
stated that increased prosecutorial discovery "would appear neces-
sary to prevent the defendant from obtaining an unfair advan-
tage." 94 Learned Hand in 1923 anticipated the Advisory Committee
Note when he stated that "[u] nder our criminal procedure the
accused has every advantage [over the prosecution]. ' 95  Both
tect the deponent or party from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression.
The California Supreme Court has discussed the vagueness of these stand-
ards. See Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 355, 382-83, 364
P.2d 266, 279, 15 Cal. Rptr. 90, 103 (1961). Despite this vagueness the pro-
visions provide adequate protection. See McCoy, California Civil Discov-
ery, An Introduction, 41 J. ST. B. CAL. 519, 522 (1966). Protective orders
have generally been necessary only in complex litigation such as anti-trust
cases. Louisell, Discovery Today, 45 CALIF. L. REv. 486, 513-14 (1957).
91. See G. Lapides, Cross-Currents in Prosecutorial Discovery: A De-
fense Counsel's Viewpoint, 7 U.S.F.L. REv. 217, 255 (1973).
92. The state's basic investigatory power is clearly superior to that of
the defendant's. Kampfe & Dostal, Discovery in the Federal Criminal Sys-
tem, 36 MONT. L. REv. 189, 205 (1975). See Dennis v. United States, 384
U.S. 855, 878 (1966). The state's police force begins its investigation soon
after the event. It utilizes advanced scientific facilities and the combined
forces of several law enforcement agencies. Potential witnesses are more
willing to cooperate with the state than with the defense attorney. Nakell,
Discovery for the Defense and the Prosecution-The Developing Constitu-
tional Considerations, 50 N.C.L. REv. 437, 439-40 (1971-72). The state may
also subpoena witnesses to appear before a grand jury. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 939.2 (West Supp. 1976). In Iowa the prosecutor may sub-
poena a witness for an interview, but if an indictment, preliminary informa-
tion, or information has been filed, the defendant may be present and con-
duct a cross-examination. IowA CODE ANN. § 769.19 (West Supp. 1976).
93. See generally text accompanying notes 101-14 infra.
94. FED. R. CRnw. P. 16 (Advisory Comm. Note) (1966). For a similar
view, see Louisell, supra note 63.
95. United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
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these comments were addressed to systems affording the defendant
considerably less discovery than does the present California system.
The defendant presently enjoys several advantages in discovery.
One is his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 6
In California the state rarely may compel pre-trial disclosure of
evidence that the defendant intends to introduce at trial.97 This
evidence includes not only the defendant's expected testimony but
also statements by other witnesses which are in the defendant's pos-
session. Thus, the prosecution may obtain only very limited dis-
covery directly from the defendant.
Another method available to the defendant to prevent prose-
cutorial discovery is his privilege claim. By asserting a privilege,
he can prevent the other party to a patient-psychotherapist, 98 hus-
band-wife, 90 or clergyman-penitent' 00 communication from dis-
closing the contents of that communication.
In contrast to the defendant's right to prevent the prosecutor
from obtaining certain evidence is the prosecutor's obligation to dis-
close evidence to the defendant. Because the prosecutor has a duty
not only to the people of the state but also to the accused, 101 he
is expected to maintain an open file-that is, the prosecutor should,
at least to a limited extent, allow the defendant to inspect the state's
file on his case.10 2 In addition, under the 1963 United States Su-
preme Court holding in Brady v. Maryland'0 3 and its progeny, the
prosecutor must disclose to the defendant any exculpatory evidence
his investigations reveal.10 4
96. See note 38 supra.
97. See generally note 38 supra.
98. CAL. EvID. CODE § 1014 (West Supp. 1976); see also id. § 1028 (West
1966), which limits the definition of psychotherapist for criminal pro-
ceedings.
99. Id. § 980 (West 1966). For the non-applicability of this privilege in
certain criminal proceedings, see id. § 985 (West Supp. 1976) and § 987 (West
1966).
100. Id. §§ 1033 & 1034 (West 1966).
101. Address by the Honorable Paul B. Johnson, Conference of the Na-
tional District Attorneys Association, Panel on Pre-trial Discovery in Crim-
inal Cases (Aug. 21, 1964) printed in 31 BROOKLYN L. REv. 320, 323 (1964).
102. The open file policy is not complete. Many prosecutors close their
files when negotiations have failed and there is a decision to prosecute.
Osburn, supra note 38, at 147.
103. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
104. Id. at 87. See also Weatherford v. Bursey, 97 S. Ct. 837, 845 (1977)(prohibition against concealing favorable evidence does not always require
In California, however, the defendant need not rely simply on the
prosecutor's duty under Brady to open his files. Through judicially
created discovery devices defendants may compel the prosecutor to
disclose virtually all evidence which is non-privileged-that is, not
the attorney's work product-does not endanger the prosecution of
the case or other legitimate government interests-for example, does
not identify informers or reveal military secrets-and is not readily
available to the defendant by other means. 105 Thus, in most in-
stances the defendant may inspect statements which are in the
hands of the prosecutor and which were made either by the defen-
dant himself or by the prosecution witnesses,10  real evidence and
reports concerning that evidence, and the names and addresses of
eye-witnesses to the charged offense. 10 7 Obviously the criminal de-
fendant in California has sufficient methods to discover the evi-
dence supporting the prosecution's case-in-chief.
The defendant may supplement the material he obtains from the
prosecutor's file through his own efforts. If Runyan becomes the
law of California, the defendant will be allowed to use depositions
for discovery purposes. Should the California Supreme Court or
the legislature reject Runyan, the defendant would retain his right
to interview witnesses without interference by the prosecutor. A
second device available to the defendant for obtaining information
not found in the prosecutor's files is the commencing of a civil suit
relating to the same matter as do the criminal charges. This sit-
uation could occur, for example, when the defendant's assault
charges arose from a fight with the victim. The defendant, by filing
a civil assault charge against the victim, obtains the right to use
civil depositions. Because civil discovery is virtually unlimited, the
defendant obtains information unavailable to him under the rules
of criminal discovery. Although protective orders sometimes issue
the prosecution to reveal the names of its witnesses before trial; no duty to
divulge name of undercover agent); United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108-
12 (1976) (stating that the prosecutor has an affirmative duty to disclose
material exculpatory evidence but has no duty to allow the defendant to in-
spect his files). The prosecutor must also present exculpatory evidence to
the grand jury if the defendant is charged by indictment. Johnson v. Supe-
rior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 248, 251, 539 P.2d 792, 794, 124 Cal. Rptr. 32, 34 (1975).
105. See, e.g., Hill v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 812, 817-19, 518 P.2d 1353,
1356-58, 112 Cal. Rptr. 257, 260-62 (1974); In re Valerie E., 50 Cal. App.
3d 213, 219, 123 Cal. Rptr. 242, 246 (1975).
106. People v. Lindsay, 227 Cal. App. 2d 482, 510, 38 Cal. Rptr. 755, 773
(1964).
107. Id. See Vetter v. Superior Court, 189 Cal. App. 2d 132, 134-35, 10
Cal. Rptr. 890, 892-93 (1961).
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in instances of this kind, 08 the possibility of abuse is readily ap-
parent.
The defendant, in addition to his superior access to raw infor-
mation, enjoys pre-trial opportunities to observe and probe the strat-
egy of the prosecution. These opportunities arise from the proce-
dures involved in bringing a defendant to trial. A preliminary
hearing is required if a defendant is charged by a complaint. 1° 9 At
the hearing the prosecution must produce a legal theory and evi-
dence sufficient to convince the judge that the defendant should
stand trial. Thus the defendant gains an insight into the prose-
cution's case-in-chief. 110 The defendant may also call witnesses and
conduct cross-examination. One California court warned that
"[m] any magistrates have faced the problem of having skilled and
adept defense counsel attempt to turn the preliminary hearing into
full scale discovery proceedings, even to the extent of subpoenaing
all of the officers and possible witnesses involved."''
If the prosecutor charges the defendant by an indictment, a grand
jury hearing is required.11.2 Although the defendant has no right
to cross-examine or even to be present at the hearing, he is entitled
to a transcript of the proceeding. 1 3 Because the prosecutor at the
108. See United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 12 n.27 (1970); United
States v. Bridges, 86 F. Supp. 931, 933 (N.D. Cal. 1949).
109. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 737-39 (West 1970).
110. DEMEO, supra note 3, at 16.03(5); Daniel, supra note 67. DeMeo
notes that the defendant may call witnesses at the preliminary hearing.
Thus a preliminary hearing may serve as a form of deposition for each side.
This proceeding often provides the defendant with information to determine
whether he will plead guilty. See Weininger, supra note 78, at 529. See
also Shatz, supra note 3. DeMeo further notes, however, that in serious
cases the prosecutor uses grand jury proceedings, thus effectively eliminat-
ing the discovery function for both sides. DEMEO, supra note 3, at 16.03 (5).
In England the prosecution must make known to the defendant all evidence
it intends to introduce at trial. Id. at 1 16.01(3) (a).
111. People v. Ashford, 265 Cal. App. 2d 673, 680 n.3, 71 Cal. Rptr. 619,
624 n.3 (1968).
112. People y. Mersino, 237 Cal. App. 2d 265, 270, 46 Cal. Rptr. 821, 825
(1965); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 737 & 917 (West 1970).
113. CAL. PENAL CODE § 938.1 (West Supp. 1976). As a practical matter
the defendant's discovery is often quite limited. The prosecutor need only
put on enough evidence to show probable cause that the accused should
stand trial. See Weininger, supra note 78, at 526; Comment, Criminal Dis-
covery Depositions in Iowa: The Future of State v. Peterson, 60 IowA L.
REV. 345, 350 (1974). But see Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Bal-
ance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE L.J. 1149, 1191 (1960);
grand jury hearing must present the same evidence as required
at a preliminary hearing, the transcript reveals the probable testi-
mony of key witnesses and the legal theory of the prosecutor's
case.
The final procedural device available to the defendant for gaining
information concerning the prosecution's case is the pre-trial
motion.114 Usually these are motions by the defendant to suppress
evidence or compel discovery. The prosecutor may be forced in the
process of opposing the motion to reveal the legal theory of his
case-in-chief or previously undisclosed evidence. Thus, the defen-
dant gains valuable information even if he is unsuccessful in his
motion.
It is apparent from this review of devices available to the defen-
dant that he presently enjoys a superior position to the prosecution
in access to information. Granting the prosecution the right to take
discovery depositions does not alter that position. Whatever infor-
mation the prosecutor gains at the deposition is immediately avail-
able to the defendant. No matter how thorough the prosecution's
discovery, the defendant retains exclusive knowledge of those
matters protected from discovery by the fifth amendment and per-
sonal communications privileges. It appears, therefore, that oppo-
sition to prosecutorial discovery depositions based on fear of up-
setting the relative availability of information to each side is un-
founded.
Inability to Conduct Effective Cross-Examination
A final argument in opposition to prosecutorial discovery depo-
sitions is that the defendant may not be adequately prepared to
cross-examine the witness.115 The prosecution will generally seek
to depose witnesses shortly after the crime occurs. Defense counsel,
however, does not begin his investigation until the defendant is ar-
rested and counsel appointed or retained. Because the state's in-
vestigation usually starts immediately after the crime is committed,
it has superior information in the early phases of the case.116 Thus,
the defendant's counsel may, in fact, be unable to conduct an ade-
Nakell, supra note 92 (expressing the view that grand jury proceedings are
used by prosecutors as a discovery device).
114. Shatz, supra note 3, at 263; see, e.g., People v. Superior Court, 19
Cal. App. 3d 522, 531-32, 97 Cal. Rptr. 118, 125 (1971).
115. United States v. Singleton, 460 F.2d 1148, 1155 (2d Cir. 1972) (Oakes,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 984 (1973); A.B.A. SPECIAL COMMITTEE
REPORT ON FEDERAL RULES OF PROCEDURE, printed in 38 F.R.D. 95, 107 (1965).
116. See note 92 supra.
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quate cross-examination of the deponent. Because the confron-
tation clause requires an opportunity to fully and effectively cross-
examine, 1 7 this denial may rise to constitutional dimensions. Even
if the denial does not raise constitutional questions, a judge may
exercise his discretion and forbid the taking or use of depositions
on the basis of unfairness to the defendant.
Procedures can be developed to avoid these undesirable results.
One such procedure is allowing the defendant access to the prose-
cution's files in the early phases of the case. Another is allowing
the defendant to depose the prosecution's witnesses before the pros-
ecution is allowed to depose the witnesses friendly to the defend-
ant. Both procedures provide the defendant rapid access to the
facts necessary for him to cross-examine the witnesses the prose-
cution seeks to depose. Another protective device is requiring the
deposition to be noticed a considerable period of time in advance
of its taking."8 This device allows the defendant to focus his inves-
tigation on areas of the case within that witness's knowledge. With
these safeguards the possibility of denying the defendant a full and
effective cross-examination at any deposition is minimized.
Events could occur subsequent to the taking of the deposition
which indicate the defendant was denied an effective cross-exami-
nation. This situation could arise, for instance, if new evidence
comes to light after the taking of the deposition.1 19 This evidence
may suggest an important new line of inquiry. Should this situ-
ation develop, the defendant is not without remedy. He may seek
a second deposition to examine the witness on the new evidence.
117. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 407 (1965). In determining whether
a defendant was given adequate opportunity to cross-examine, the court
looks to the nature of the proceeding, the character of the witness, the wit-
ness's connection with the events, the extent and subject of the witness's
testimony, and the preparation time and opportunities the defendant had.
People v. Gibbs, 255 Cal. App. 2d 739, 742, 63 Cal. Rptr. 471, 474-75 (1968).
118. Under Vermont's former procedure of allowing only defense deposi-
tions, the practice was carried out almost entirely by stipulation. This prac-
tice may be a result of Vermont's small bar and rural character. Langrock,
supra note 63, at 733. The results may be different in California. Another
difference is that prosecutors, because they are better prepared in the early
stages of the case, may seek depositions earlier than is convenient for the
defendant. Thus, California probably may expect the setting of many de-
position times by court order.
119. See Comment, Confrontation: A Trial Right?-United States v.
Singleton, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 839, 847.
If the witness is unavailable for a second deposition, the trial judge
must exercise his discretion on the issue of admitting the deposition
into evidence. If the judge finds that the defendant was denied full
cross-examination, he may declare inadmissible those portions of
the deposition effected by the denial.
As demonstrated, the reasons put forth in opposition to prose-
cutorial defense depositions are not persuasive. Opponents of pros-
ecutorial depositions have largely ignored the ability of the judi-
ciary to protect against abuses of the judicial process. With the
safeguards of judicial supervision, constitutionally mandated pro-
tections, and full defense discovery, the criminal defendant has little
to fear from prosecutorial depositions.
POLICY ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF PROSECUTORIAL
DISCOVERY DEPOSITIONS
Proponents of prosecutorial discovery depositions maintain that
the use of such devices would improve the standard of justice in
California courts. This claim is based on the ability of depositions
to improve the quality and quantity of evidence available to each
party,120 preserve testimony,12' and curb possible abuses arising
when hearsay evidence is used. 22 Prosecutorial depositions would
also result in an expansion of the open file policy,123 reduce claims
of abuse resulting from the informal procedure of interviewing wit-
nesses,12 4 and improve the timing of pre-trial preparation. 125 Fi-
nally, a grant of increased pre-trial discovery for the prosecution
may result in a similar grant to the defendant.126
Improved Evidence
The key advantage of prosecutorial discovery depositions is that
they ensure a "fuller and fairer factual presentation at trial."' 27
120. See text accompanying notes 127-37 infra.
121. See text accompanying notes 138-40 infra.
122. See text accompanying notes 141-50 infra.
123. See text accompanying notes 151-53 infra.
124. See text accompanying notes 154 infra.
125. See text accompanying notes 155-57 infra.
126. See text accompanying notes 158-68 infra.
127. See Contemporary Studies Project: Perspectives on the Adminis-
tration of Criminal Justice in Iowa, 57 IowA L. REV. 598, 726 (1972). The
study, in discussing proposals for increased defense discovery, appeared to
adopt the position that:
In the adversary approach to criminal justice, the theory is that
each side, through its champion, the advocate, will endeavor to
present its best supportive evidence and will subject to penetrating
examination the evidence presented by the opposing side. It is be-
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This advantage accrues because the prosecutor, by skillfully depos-
ing witnesses, gains insight and factual information concerning his
case unavailable by other means. The trier of fact, armed with
the complete data provided by the parties, makes an accurate ap-
praisal of the guilt or innocence of the defendant. This accuracy
is diminished if the trier of fact is denied a total picture of the
crime and its participants. Thus, the availability of prosecutorial
depositions helps to guarantee a correct verdict in criminal cases.
The pre-trial availability of evidence also ensures that the trial
proceeds with fewer surprises for each party. Because an attorney
at trial is often hesitant to ask questions to which he does not al-
ready know the answer, many matters can never be examined.
128
If an attorney does ask a question of this kind and receives a sur-
prising answer, he either may continue his examination on the
point, thereby risking bringing out even more unfavorable evidence,
or he may seek a continuance to investigate the matter. 29 Both
these results disrupt the smooth presentation of the attorney's case.
lieved that in the glaring light so generated the judge or jury will
perceive the truth. However, this can be done best if both sides
are prepared and have reasonable knowledge of what the other side
will present.
Id.
A study of omnibus procedures in the United States District Court for
San Diego found that "[b] ecause facts in most criminal trials are hotly dis-
puted or difficult to obtain by other means, defendants usually make maxi-
mum use of available discovery in preparing for trial." Weininger, supra
note 78, at 516-17. See also Traynor, supra note 88, at 249.
128. Cf. 5 WIGMORE, supra note 19, at § 1368, at 38-39 (explaining the dan-
gers of cross-examination when the attorney does not know the witness's
expected testimony). Although -a judge may call and examine witnesses,
CAL. EVID. CODE § 775 (West 1966), the primary duty of presenting evidence
lies with counsel. See United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 230 (1975).
Thus, the evidence produced at trial is often limited to that within the
knowledge of counsel. Osburn, supra note 38, at 145-46. For discussions
of the advantages and disadvantages of allowing the jury and judge to ex-
amine witnesses see, Strawn v. State ex rel Anderberg, 332 So. 2d 601 (Fla.
1976); 12 ALA. L. REV. 185 (1959).
129. Continuances are available through CAL. PENAL CODE § 1050 (West
1970). Nebraska, because of its liberal rules of discovery, has eliminated
the traditional provision allowing surprise as a grounds for having evidence
declared inadmissible as unduly prejudicial. Dow, Criminal Hearsay
Rules: Constitutional Issues, 53 NEB. L. REV. 425, 427 (1974). A Vermont
court denied a defendant's post-conviction appeal for a new trial on the
grounds of newly discovered evidence. The court held that because the evi-
dence would have been discovered by deposing the witness, the defendant's
claim was invalid. State v. Ciocca, 126 Vt. 184, 225 A.2d 65 (1966).
If pre-trial depositions are allowed, the attorney can avoid the dan-
gers of surprise testimony and thus reduce the number of contin-
uances for investigations and hearings on evidentiary matters.180
In addition, if evidentiary questions brought out in pre-trial
hearings are appealed before a plenary trial takes place,131 the num-
ber of cases being reversed and retried for judicial errors is re-
duced.132 This reduction saves both the state and the defendant
unnecessary expenditures of time and money. Prosecutorial depo-
sitions can, therefore, serve a valuable role by ensuring the efficient
operation of the judicial process.
A final benefit arising from the improved knowledge of the case
provided by depositions is the increased likelihood of pre-trial dis-
positions."'3  These dispositions-that is, plea bargaining and dis-
missals-occur because each party can analyze the strength of the
opposing party's position. The defendant and prosecutor see the
facts formalized in the deposition transcript rather than as mere
investigatory files which may or may not accurately reflect the
factual situation. 34  In addition, by observing the witness at the
deposition, each party can evaluate the impact of that witness's
demeanor upon the trier of fact. Because an estimated ninety per-
cent of all convictions and ninety-five percent of all misdemeanor
convictions in the United States result from guilty pleas,13r the im-
130. ABA, supra note 78, at pt. I, Standard I.I.
131. Writs of mandate or prohibition are available to permit review of
discovery orders before trial. E.g., Lee v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. App. 3d
851, 852, 130 Cal. Rptr. 532, 533 (1976); Clark v. Superior Court, 190 Cal.
App. 2d 739, 740, 12 Cal. Rptr. 191, 191 (1961).
132. See note 130 supra.
133. A study in Vermont polled the state's prosecutors, judges of courts
with criminal jurisdiction, and leading defense attorneys. The study con-
cluded that open discovery and depositions remove "the element of bluffing
and encourage defense counsel and prosecutor to work out a solution to
the alleged crime." Langrock, supra, note 63, at 734. The maintenance of
an open file system whereby the defendant realizes the full strength of the
prosecution's case induces guilty pleas. Osburn, supra note 38, at 146-
47. Access to police reports is thought to have similar results. Daniel,
supra note 67, at 137.
"An informed settlement would lead to a more humane, individualistic
administration of criminal law, tempering the dominating discretion and
control of the'prosecutor." Fletcher, Pre-trial Discovery in State Criminal
Cases, 12 STAN. L. REv. 293, 319 (1960). Moreover, the United States Su-
preme Court in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971), has stated
that plea bargaining should be encouraged.
134. See Langrock, supra note 63, at 733.
135. D. NEWMAN, THE DETERMINATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT
TRIA 3 n.1 (1966). The overall figure for California in 1965 was 74%. Tim
PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JusTicE,
TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 9 (1967).
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portance of this procedure is obvious. Some authorities believe
that even more defendants will plead guilty if they have a greater
knowledge of the prosecution's case.136 The experience in juris-
dictions which allow the defendant liberal discovery and deposition
rights supports the contention that such procedures promote pre-
trial dispositions.13 7
The benefits of fair pre-trial settlements are manifold. A guilty
defendant who would have pleaded innocent avoids the expense and
mental rigors of trial. Conversely, innocent defendants will be re-
leased from the threat of trial if the evidence produced by depo-
sitions convinces the prosecutor of the defendant's innocence. The
state benefits from settlements by avoiding the expense of unneces-
sary prosecutions and appeals.
Preservation of Testimony
Depositions act to preserve the testimony of the deponent for use
in later proceedings. Under the present California system the pros-
ecutor must prove at the time of the deposition that the witness
will be unavailable for trial.138 Thus the testimony of a witness
who unexpectedly dies, becomes incapacitated, or evades the
court's subpoena power 30 is lost. This lost testimony is sometimes
the critical evidence necessary to convict a guilty defendant. There-
fore, preventing the prosecution from deposing a witness sometimes
results in the inability of the state to successfully conduct an other-
wise winning case. To avoid such results the prosecutor may pre-
fer to rush a poorly prepared case to trial before the witness is lost.
The results of this hasty preparation will often be undesirable. If
136. See note 133 supra.
137. In the Vermont study none of the polled individuals thought de-
positions increased the likelihood of trial. The great majority believed they
decreased the possibility. Langrock, supra note 63, at 733. Two-thirds of
those polled in a study of the federal omnibus procedure said the discovery
allowed thereunder was "very helpful" in evaluating the prosecution's case.
Weininger, supra note 78, at 554 n.175.
138. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1341 (West 1970).
139. Attendance of witnesses who have left the jurisdiction may gen-
erally be compelled by CAL. PENAL CODE § 1334-1334.6 (West 1970). This
uniform act, in effect in every state, authorizes the taking into custody and
delivery to the forum state of witnesses for grand jury hearings or criminal
prosecutions. In People v. Gibbs, 255 Cal. App. 2d 739, 744, 63 Cal. Rptr.
471, 475 (1967), the court noted that informers are frequently unavailable
for trial.
the defendant is in fact innocent, he will have unnecessarily suf-
fered through a trial. The prosecutor, if his preparation had been
complete, would probably have realized the defendant was innocent
and not proceeded to trial. Conversely, a guilty defendant who is
found not guilty largely because of a poorly prepared prosecution
is unjustifiably not punished, for the double jeopardy clause of the
Constitution protects him from reprosecution. 140  Thus, preserving
the testimony of witnesses protects vital interests of both the state
and innocent defendants.
The benefits of allowing the prosecutor to preserve testimony,
however, do not flow exclusively to the state and the innocent de-
fendant. Rather, all defendants gain by the opportunity to observe
the prosecutor examine a witness. If the deponent is a friendly
witness, the prosecutor seeks to preserve his testimony in a form
most favorable to his case. Thus, the defendant hears the depo-
nent's testimony in the same form as it will be presented at trial.
This testimony may reveal evidence previously unknown to the
defendant. It is impossible for the defendant to obtain such insight
into the prosecution's case by any other means.
Curing Hearsay Abuses
The use of hearsay evidence in the trial situation is considered
a necessity.14' Commentators admit, however, that hearsay evi-
dence is susceptible to abuse. 42 One example of such abuse occurs
if a witness at the trial falsely claims that a third party made a
particular statement. If the third party declarant is unavailable
for trial and the alleged statement is a spontaneous declaration,
43
declaration against interest,14 4 statement of prior mental or physical
140. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 437 (1970). A defendant is put
in jeopardy and may not be reprosecuted once the defendant is "put to trial
before the trier of fact." United States v. Jorn, 400 U.S. 470, 479 (1971).
For circumstances allowing appeal by the state following a ruling for the
defendant, see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1235 (West 1970) and § 1238 (West Supp.
1976).
141. See Dow, supra note 129.
142. See generally McCoRMICK, supra note 40, at §§ 244-46.
143. CAL. Ev-D. CODE § 1240 (West 1966). The declarant's statement
which falls under one of the hearsay exceptions is admissable whether or
not he is available. CAL. EvID. CoDE § 1203(d) (West 1966). Id. § 1204
controls the admission of hearsay statements into evidence in criminal trials.
The section basically requires that to be admissible a hearsay statement
must have been made "Under such circumstances that it is [constitutionally
admissible] against the defendant"-for example, not an involuntary state-
ment. But see People v. Agee, 67 Cal. App. 3d 148, 155, 136 Cal. Rptr. 492,
495 (1977), which holds that prior unsworn inconsistent statements of a
witness are not admissible as substantive evidence.
144. CAL. EviD. CODE § 1230 (West 1966).
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state,145 or dying declaration,14 6 the statement may be considered
for its probative value. If the prosecutor seeks to rebut the per-
jurious hearsay by showing that the hearsay is contrary to other
statements made by the declarant, he may use two devices: ordi-
nary hearsay of his own or the deposition of the third party decla-
rant.147 Ordinary hearsay may be sufficient to demonstrate the
falseness of the perjurious hearsay. A deposition, however, is prob-
ably far more effective.148 It is the direct statement of the decla-
rant, made under oath, accurately and impartially recorded, and
subject to cross-examination. Consequently, depositions provide
an extremely effective device to expose and rebut perjurious hear-
say.149
The ability of prosecutorial depositions to deter perjurious hear-
say is not limited to their use as rebuttal evidence or solely for
the prosecutor's benefit. Assume, for example, that the prosecution
introduces a hearsay statement made by an unavailable declarant.
The defendant may respond by questioning why hearsay is relied
upon rather than a deposition of the declarant. A similar situation
occurs when the defendant confronts a witness at trial with a prior
inconsistent statement. The question arises of why the confronting
party has not sought to depose the witness on that subject. If no
logical explanation is forthcoming, the trier of fact may infer that
the hearsay is of doubtful validity.
145. Id. § 1251.
146. Id. § 1242.
147. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2016 (d) (West Supp. 1976). This section
lists the circumstances under which a deposition may be used in California
civil proceedings. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 686(3) (b) (West Supp. 1976),
which allows the use of depositions in criminal cases when permissable
under other provisions of California law.
148. Interviews of witnesses are inferior to depositions. A witness being
deposed is under oath and hence subject to the contempt power of the court
for perjury. This assurance of truthfulness is lacking in interviews. Cf.
Hill v. Superior Court, 10 Cal. 3d 812, 819, 518 P.2d 1353, 1357, 112 Cal. Rptr.
257, 261 (1974) (stating witnesses in interviews will not make truthful
statements about delicate subjects).
The deposition may be read to the jury, but they may not take it with
them when retiring for their deliberations. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1137 (West
Supp. 1976).
149. The prior consistent statement of a witness is admissible if a prior
inconsistent statement made by him has been admitted and the consistent
statement was made before the inconsistent statement or if a charge of re-
cent fabrication, bias, or improper motive has been made. CAL. Evn,. CODE
§§ 791 & 1236 (West 1966).
In light of the low respect hearsay is often accorded,10 any in-
strument to reduce its use should be welcomed. California, how-
ever, by forbidding prosecutorial discovery depositions denies both
the prosecution and the defense a valuable weapon to counteract
perjurious hearsay testimony.
Increased Open File Policy
The ability to inspect a prosecutor's files at will is a great con-
venience for the defendant. The expense and delay of formal dis-
covery orders are avoided. Unfortunately, the "openness" of the
open file policy varies among different prosecutor's offices.' One
device which has proved effective in increasing such openness is
discovery depositions for the defendant. 15 2 It can be hypothesized
that the prosecutor allows the defendant to inspect his files because
a defendant armed with discovery depositions can obtain most of
the information even without his cooperation. Thus, any reason to
shield his files is removed. However, some prosecutors resist the
open file policy because of the great ability of the defendant to
gather information through depositions. The prosecutor believes
that the defendant already enjoys an advantage, and the prosecutor
is not willing to voluntarily increase that advantage.'" If the pros-
ecutor is granted discovery depositions, however, this belief may
disappear. Therefore, permitting the prosecutor to depose witnes-
ses should result in an expansion of the open file policy and its ac-
companying benefits.
Informal Interview Abuses
The presence of opposing counsel at depositions is a guarantee
against improper attorney conduct. Informal interviews, in con-
150. See note 142 supra.
151. See note 102 supra.
152. Langrock, supra, note 63.
153. "Defendants who seek the advantages of broad discovery must also
accept its burdens. There is no reason to believe that prosecutors will re-
veal their cases as long as defense counsel shirk their discovery responsi-
bilities." Weininger, supra note 78, at 552. In 1973 it appeared Oregon's
defense attorneys recognized the value of reciprocity and approved in-
creased prosecutorial discovery. Osburn, supra note 38, at 147. The duty
to disclose exculpatory evidence is also occasionally abused. Nakell, supra
note 92, at 455-57.
Some prosecutors believe increased prosecutorial discovery would not re-
sult in further cooperation because there is already almost total candor on
the part of the prosecution toward the defense. Telephone interview with
attorney from the San Diego County District Attorney's office, San Diego,
Ca. (March 2, 1977).
[VOL. 14: 936, 1977J Prosecutorial Discovery Depositions
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
trast, are generally ex parte meetings. Thus, J. N. DeMeo, a leading
expert on California discovery, has stated that "[t] here are certain
inherent dangers to interviewing witnesses, rather than taking for-
mal depositions, as the defense attorney faces the potential danger
of being accused of subornation of perjury or witness tamper-
ing."'154 This statement is equally applicable to prosecutors. Pro-
viding prosecutors the right to depose witnesses would both protect
them from unfounded charges of subornation of perjury and assure
the defendant that such activities do not occur.
Pre-Trial Preparation
Adequate pre-trial preparation is a critical element in assuring
a successful defense or prosecution. 155 The parties should conduct
their investigations as soon after the crime occurs as possible.
156
The state is able to secure information immediately after the event
because its police forces respond rapidly to the crime. However,
a busy public defender or private defense attorney may defer his
investigation until other more pressing cases are disposed of. Be-
cause the prosecutor's files will not contain the exact information
the defendant needs, 57 the defendant loses evidence by his delay.
This undesirable situation is partially rectifiable by granting the
prosecutor the right to take depositions. The pendency of those
depositions forces the defendant to conduct investigations in prep-
aration for his cross-examination. This pre-trial preparation en-
sures a more adequate defense at trial.
Increased Defense Discovery
Although prosecutorial depositions are opposed by people seeking
to protect defendants, such opposition may be short-sighted. There
are indications that the unavailability of prosecutorial discovery
limits the creation of defense discovery.
The reason for limiting defense discovery pending expansion of
prosecutorial discovery is that the defendant already enjoys a su-
154. DEMEO, supra note 3, at 1 16.03 (2).
155. F. BAILEY & H. ROTHBLATT, INVESTIGATION AND PREPARATION OF CRIM-
NTAL CASES § 1 (1970).
156. Id. § 10.
157. Id. § 2.
perior position in access to information. 158 Further liberalizing de-
fense discovery could put the defendant in such a superior position
that the trial loses its character as a clash between adversaries.
Thus the Advisory Committee Note to Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 16 stated in 1975 that "[t]he majority of the Advisory
Committ4e is of the view that the two-prosecutorial and defense
discovery-are related and that the giving of a broader right of
discovery to the defense is dependent upon giving also a broader
right of discovery to the prosecution."' 59
The attitude that defense discovery should not be expanded until
the prosecutor has adequate means of discovery may demonstrate
itself in several fashions. The recent Runyan 10 decision allowing
discovery depositions for the defendant provides a good example.
If either the California Supreme Court or the legislature determines
that expansion of defense discovery is contingent on expanded pros-
ecutorial discovery, the Runyan procedure may be annulled. If,
however, Runyan is affirmed, the defense's battle is still not won.
The defendant's right to depose witnesses is vested in the trial
judge's discretion. 16 The judge may simply deny the defendant's
request. Alternatively, the judge may grant the defendant's re-
quest for depositions but in return deny the defendant any right
to inspect the prosecution's files concerning the witnesses. This de-
nial may be proper because the defendant is allowed to discover
only those materials in the prosecutor's files which he cannot obtain
by his own efforts. 62 By being granted the right to depose the
witnesses, the defendant does have the means to obtain such infor-
mation. Thus the price California defendants may pay for the right
to depose witnesses is the right to inspect the prosecution's files.
158. See text accompanying notes 94 & 95 supra.
159. FED. R. Cmm. P. 16 (Advisory Comm. Note) (1975). See also Osburn,
supra note 38 at 146. The Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Pedersen, 219
N.W.2d 665 (Iowa 1974), allowed the defendant to depose witnesses. One
reason for so allowing was the prosecution's reciprocal discovery device in
IowA CODE § 769.19 (West Supp. 1976). See 13A BENDER'S FoRMs or Dxscov-
my, supra note 39, at § 8.11, at 8-216, for cases granting prosecutorial discov-
ery if reciprocal rights are granted to the defense.
The recent growth of prosecutorial discovery in other jurisdictions may
be the result of previous grantings of discovery rights to the defendant. See
Traynor, supra note 88, at 246.
The court in Clark v. Superior Court, 190 Cal. App. 2d 739, 742, 12 Cal.
Rptr. 191, 193 (1961), stated "[tihe right to take depositions should be a
mutual one." The statement appears to have been an expression of dis-
pleasure with the present system, for it was largely irrelevant to the decis-
ion.
160. People v. Municipal Court (Runyan), 63 Cal. App. 3d 815, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 106 (1976), hearing granted, No. 77-9 (Cal. Sup. Ct., Jan. 13, 1977).
161. See note 53 supra.
162. See note 105 supra and accompanying text. A Vermont case held
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It is not necessary, however, for California's defendants to suffer
such consequences. If the prosecution is granted the right to depose
witnesses, the legislature and judiciary may willingly grant defen-
dants both discovery depositions and inspection of prosecutor's files.
Such rights may, in fact, be constitutionally required.
The requirement that a grant of increased discovery for the prose-
cutor must be matched by a similar grant to the defendant is best
illustrated by the United States Supreme Court's treatment of no-
tice-of-alibi statutes. In Wardius v. Oregon'6 3 the Court declared
Oregon's notice-of-alibi statute unconstitutional. The Court distin-
guished Oregon's statute from a similar Florida statute found con-
stitutional in Williams v. Florida.6 4 The distinguishing factor was
the Florida statute's provision for reciprocal discovery by the de-
fense. The Court in Wardius noted that the Williams decision "em-
phasized that the constitutionality of such rules might depend on
'whether the defendant enjoys reciprocal discovery against the
State.' "165
The basis of the Wardius opinion is the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. The Court stated that:
Although the Due Process Clause has little to say regarding the
amount of discovery which the parties must be afforded ... it does
speak of the balance of forces between the accused and his ac-
cusor.160
This Court has therefore been particularly suspicious of state trial
rules which provide nonreciprocal benefits to the State when the
it was not error to deny a defendant a copy of the grand jury transcript
because he had other sufficient means-that is, depositions-to secure the
information. State v. Miner, 128 Vt. 55, 64, 258 A.2d 815, 820 (1969).
When the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure first granted liberal discovery
"[s]ome Courts found it hard to accept the new . . .provisions and were
quick to seize upon any collateral consideration to restrict the application
of the rules." Freedman, Discovery as an Instrument of Justice, 22 TF-p.
L.Q. 174, 175 (1948).
163. 412 U.S. 470 (1972).
164. 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
165. 412 U.S. at 471, quoting in part from Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S.
78, 82 n.11 (1970). The Court described liberal rules of discovery for the
prosecution and defense as "a salutary development which, by increasing
the evidence available to both parties, enhances the fairness of the adver-
sary system." 412 U.S. at 474. The court further noted that "[a]s [the
court] recognized in Williams, nothing in the Due Process Clause precludes
states from experimenting with systems of broad discovery." Id.
166. 412 U.S. at 474 (citations omitted).
lack of reciprocity interferes with the defendant's ability to secure
a fair trial.167
The California Supreme Court has adopted the Wardius reciprocity
philosophy."68  Thus substantial reason exists to believe that the
best way for the defense to ensure its own liberal pre-trial discov-
ery is by accepting prosecutorial discovery depositions.
Supporting Authorities
This Note is not alone in its endorsement of prosecutorial
depositions. The Task Force on Administration of Justice, which
consisted of distinguished practicing attorneys and scholars, recog-
nized discovery depositions as a valuable fact-finding proce-
dure.169 It recommended that jurisdictions amend their statutes
to allow prosecutors and defendants the right to such depositions.
In 1974 Vermont followed 'the advice of the Task Force by en-
acting Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 15.170 The Reporter's
Note stated that "granting the prosecution the right to take depo-
sitions is consistent with . . . the entire purpose of these rules to
make the administration of criminal justice more efficient."'u7
California inferentially approved such procedures when Justice
Traynor stated that "absent the privilege against self-incrimination
or other privileges provided by law, the defendant in a criminal
case has no valid interest in denying the prosecution access to evi-
dence that can throw light on the issues in the case.' 17 2
With such distinguished authority as support, no judge or legis-
lator should feel hesitant in advocating depositions for the prose-
cution.
PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
This Note proposes three basic plans for the reform of Cali-
fornia's deposition practice. Each achieves distinct results.
Conditional Examinations for Capital Offenses
The first plan for reform calls for the amendment of Penal Code
167. Id. at 474 n.6 (citations omitted).
168. See Evans v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 3d 617, 623, 522 P.2d 681, 685,
114 Cal. Rptr. 121, 125 (1974).
169. PRESIENT'S COMM., supra note 135, at 43.
170. VT. R. Cnm. P. 15 (1974).
171. Id. (Reporter's Notes).
172. Jones v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 56, 59, 373 P.2d 919, 920, 22 Cal.
Rptr. 879, 880 (1962).
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section 1335 to reverse the effect of the 1976 case of Lee v. Superior
Court.17 3 In Lee, the prosecutor sought to conditionally examine
a witness expected to be unavailable for trial. The defendant was
charged by indictment with two murders and had previously been
convicted of a third murder. If convicted, he would be subject to
a mandatory death penalty. 174 The prosecution's request was
denied because Penal Code section 1335 provides that the prose-
cution may have witnesses conditionally examined in cases other
than those for which the punishment may be death. The prose-
cution's argument that the code bars only the use of the deposition
at trial, not its taking, was rejected.175
In effect, Lee requires the prosecution to elect the crimes for
which the defendant will be charged before the witness becomes
unavailable. Three results can flow from that requirement. (1)
The prosecutor may delay initiation of the prosecution until he can
determine whether sufficient evidence exists to convict the defen-
dant of a capital offense without the witness's conditional exami-
nation. (2) The prosecutor may decide to charge a defendant with
less than a capital offense. (3) The prosecutor may be forced to
trial without the testimony of a key witness.
Delaying prosecution is undesirable because the evidence is staler
and the potential defendant has a greater opportunity to leave the
jurisdiction. Additionally, the potential defendant endures an ex-
tended period subject to a possibile prosecution. Finally, the public
is denied a rapid vindication of its rights.
Prosecution on a lesser charge is also undesirable. Each of the
offenses for which the death penalty is prescribed involves beha-
173. 58 Cal. App. 3d 852, 130 Cal. Rptr. 532 (1976).
174. Although a defendant may no longer be executed, a sentence of exe-
cution still has legal effects. See notes 176 & 177 infra. In California the
death penalty is authorized for eight offenses: treason (CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 37 (West 1970) ), perjury in capital cases (id. § 128), first degree murder
(id. § 190 (West Supp. 1976)), kidnapping for ransom or robbery with
bodily harm to the victim (id. § 209 (West Supp. 1976)), train wrecking
(id. § 219 (West Supp. 1976)), malicious assault by life prisoner (id. § 4500
(West Supp. 1976)), explosion of destructive devices causing great bodily
injury (id. § 12310 (West Supp. 1976)), and sabotage resulting in death
or great bodily injury (CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 1672(a) (West 1955)).
Circumstances mandating the death penalty are found in CAL. PENAL CODE§§ 37, 128, 4500 (West 1970) and § 190.2 (West.Supp. 1976).
175. 58 Cal. App. 3d at 853, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
vior intolerable to society. The legislature, by allowing or man-
dating the death penalty, indicated that such behavior must be dealt
with harshly. However, the prosecutor, by being forced to elect
charges prematurely, is denied an opportunity to fully develop his
evidence. Thus he may decide to charge a non-capital offense in
the belief that he cannot obtain any conviction without the depo-
sition. Later, the accumulated evidence may become sufficient to
secure a conviction without the use of the deposition. Nevertheless,
the prosecutor, having made his irrevocable election, is prevented
from charging the defendant with the capital crime. Thus, the
state is denied full law enforcement and the alleged offender gains
an advantage completely unrelated to any recognized policy or con-
stitutional guarantees.
This situation can easily be avoided. Penal Code section 1335
should be amended to prevent the use, but not the taking, of condi-
tional examinations in capital cases. The prosecutor would then
be able to evaluate his evidence as the time for trial approaches. If
the evidence in absence of the deposition proves inadequate, he may
prosecute for a non-capital offense. If the evidence is adequate for
conviction, the likelihood of settlement is increased because the de-
fendant faces a potentially longer incarceration under the death pen-
alty.176 The people's right to full prosecution is thus vindicated.
The accused continues to enjoy the benefit of the statutory policy
that "no defendant should be put to death upon the testimony
of a witness whose demeanor -was not observed by the trier of
fact" 177 because the conditional examination may not be intro-
duced into evidence.
176. Because of the present unconstitutionality of executions in Califor-
nia, all people sentenced to death are instead given life sentences. Califor-
nia v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 657 n.45, 493 P.2d 880, 899 n.45, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 152, 171 n.45 (1972). The offender may be paroled in seven years.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 3046 (West 1970). If the defendant is convicted of sec-
ond degree murder, he may be sentenced to prison for a minimum of five
years. Id. § 190 (West Supp. 1976). Under California's new sentencing
laws, which become effective on July 1, 1977, a defendant convicted of
second degree murder may receive a sentence of from five to seven years.
Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976, ch. 1139, Stat. of 1976, 1976
Cal. Legis. Serv. 4752, 4784 (West). In the circumstances presented in Lee,
the prosecutor could not charge the defendant with first degree murder and
also conditionally examine the witness. Thus, the severest conviction the
defendant receives in this situation is for second degree murder. UnderCalifornia's new sentencing laws a defendant convicted of certain violent
crimes will be sentenced to an additional three year minimum incarcera-
tion for each prior violent crime conviction. Id. at 4816-18. For legisla-
tive efforts to deny parole to prisoners convicted of capital crimes and to
revive California's death penalty, see note 177 infra.
177. Lee v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. App. 3d 851, 853, 130 Cal. Rptr. 532,
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The loss of critical testimony may occur when the prosecutor
charges the defendant with a capital offense. By so doing, he loses
the right to conditionally examine the witness. If the witness is
ultimately unavailable for trial, the prosecution could be unsuc-
cessful. The deposition may have been the necessary ingredient
for conviction. Thus, the defendant may go totally free although
the underlying policy is to prevent only his execution on such evi-
dence. Clearly this result is undesirable. If the prosecutor is al-
lowed to preserve the witness's testimony, he may be able to secure
a conviction for a lesser offense.
Depositions upon Written Interrogatories
A second plan for reform allows the preservation of evidence in
all cases, but denies prosecutorial discovery. The legislature can
create such a device by enacting in the Penal Code a provision for
533 (1976). A defendant may no longer be executed in California. Califor-
nia v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 657, 494 P.2d 880, 899, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152,
171 (1972). The courts, however, have not been able to determine the exact
effect of this ruling on statutes which prescribe different procedures when
the crime is punishable by death. E.g., People v. Reyes, 60 Cal. App. 3d
227, 231, 131 Cal. Rptr. 340, 343 (1976). The California Supreme Court has
indicated that when the procedure involved is harsher toward an individual
convicted of a capital offense, invoking that procedure is proper-for ex-
ample, denial of bail. California v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 657 n.45, 493
P.2d 880, 899 n.45, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152, 171 n.45 (1972). Under Penal Code
section 1335, however, a defendant who has committed a crime punishable
by death is treated more leniently than is one charged with a less serious
crime. The reason for this leniency has disappeared with the disappearance
of the death penalty. '
However, the protection afforded by Penal Code section 1335 may retain
validity. Efforts are being made to make parole unavailable to defendants
convicted of capital offenses. See A.B. 174, Cal. Leg., 1977-1978 Reg. Sess.(Jan. 10, 1977); A.B. 37, Cal. Leg., 1977-1978 Reg. Sess. (Dec. 10, 1976); A.
Const. Res. 5, 1977-1978 Reg. Sess. (Dec. 12, 1976). Parole will not be
available under California's new sentencing act, which becomes effective on
July 1, 1977, when the defendant is sentenced to life imprisonment for first
degree murder by torture, Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act of 1976,
ch. 1139, Stat. of 1976, 1976 Cal. Legis. Serv. 4752, 4784 (West), kidnapping
resulting in bodily harm to any person subject to the act, id. at 4785, or train
wrecking when any person suffers bodily harm, id. at 4786. Efforts are also
being made to conform California's death penalty statutes to the federal
constitutional standard that the penalty need not be mandatory if the sen-
tencing authority's discretion is guided and limited by statute. Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976). For example, S.B. 155, Cal. Leg., 1977-
1978 Reg. Sess. (Jan. 19, 1977), which would require the death penalty for
certain crimes, was passed by the Assembly and Senate but vetoed by the
Governor on May 27, 1977. Efforts are being made to override the veto.
The San Diego Union, May 28, 1977, at A-1, col. 6.
taking depositions upon written interrogatories. 1 78 Under this pro-
posed procedure the prosecutor serves a set of interrogatories on
a court appointed officer and the opposing counsel. The officer pro-
pounds the interrogatories to the witness. The prosecution is not
present, but defense counsel, the defendant, and counsel for the wit-
ness are present. The defendant is allowed full cross-examination,
thus guaranteeing his right of confrontation. The testimony is then
sealed and delivered to the court without examination by the prose-
cutor. 179 Thus, the deposition cannot be used for prosecutorial dis-
covery. If the witness subsequently becomes unavailable, or a
party seeks to impeach the witness's testimony, the party desiring
to admit the deposition requests an in camera hearing at the trial.
At that time objections are heard and rulings made on the ad-
missibility of the evidence.
This procedure allows the prosecutor to conduct his pre-trial prep-
aration and trial with the knowledge that evidence will not sud-
denly become unavailable. Witnesses are safe from intimidation
because their testimony is already recorded. Criminals will not be
allowed to go free because of their ability to intimidate the wit-
nesses. The state is saved the expense of protecting key witnesses
from possible physical harm and is assured full and complete pun-
ishment of offenders. All these benefits can accrue without vio-
lating the constitutional rights of the defendant.
Prosecutoriai Discovery Depositions
A third plan makes available non-party discovery depositions for
both the prosecution and the defense. The same basic procedures
and rules of evidence would apply for both civil and criminal deposi-
tions. Thus, the criminal procedure would involve noticing the dep-
osition, °80 reserving objections to the time of trial,181 and respect-
ing witness privileges. 8 2  Criminal deposition practice should
also follow the civil practice in not requiring leave of court to de-
pose a witness. 83 There are two reasons for this: the workload
of the court is reduced and the infusion of judicial discretion is
178. This civil procedure is defined in CAL. CIV. Psoc. CODE § 2020 (West
Supp. 1976).
179. Anyone disclosing the contents of the deposition would be subject
to the contempt power of the court.
180. CAL. CIV. PRoc. CODE § 2019(a) (1) (West Supp. 1976).
181. Id. §§ 2016(e) & 2021(c).
182. See notes 98-100 supra.
183. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2016 (a) (West Supp. 1976). Vermont follows
this practice. VT. R. CRim. P. 15 (1974).
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minimized.'8 4 A party may, however, oppose the deposition by
showing good cause why it should not be taken.'8 5 The usual pro-
tective orders preventing abuse or oppression would of course be
available. 86 This final plan ensures the full discovery and preser-
vation of evidence necessary for a modern criminal proceeding.
CONCLUSION
The ultimate goal of a trial is to provide a proper ruling of law
based on the fullest and most accurate factual record possible. The
present California system inhibits the attainment of that goal. This
Note has attempted to demonstrate how prosecutorial depositions
will rectify this situation. In particular, an effort has been made
to illustrate how prosecutorial depositions benefit the defendant
and help cure the ills of expense, perjury, and counsel misconduct
which occasionally infect the criminal process. For years the
expansion of prosecutorial discovery and depositions has labored
under the specter of intrusion into vital defense rights. Hopefully,
some of that specter has been dispelled and the door opened for
the use of prosecutorial criminal discovery depositions.
GEORGE JAMES WILLIAMS, JR.
184. The experience with vesting discretion in the trial judge has not
always been happy. "The . . . Committee . . . recognized the fact that
arbitrary and discriminatory application of discovery by leave of court is
prevalent throughout the State." Note, The Constitutional Implications of
Discovery Practice in Quasi-Criminal Prosecutions in Illinois, 7 Loy. CHI.
L.J. 79, 93 (1976). See also Note, Criminal Procedure-Discovery-Move-
ment Towards Full Disclosure, 77 W. VA. L. REV. 561, 563 (1975). The
California courts have almost absolute discretion in granting discovery.
Shatz, supra note 3, at 289.
185. Good cause may be demonstrated by showing a privilege the de-
fendant may assert to block a witness's testimony, financial hardship, or
lack of materiality of the expected testimony. The list is not exhaustive,
and the court must retain its discretion to achieve justice. See Brennan,
supra note 75, at 65.
186. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 2019 (b) (1) (West Supp. 1976).

